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ABSTRACT
The rate of foreign direct investment made by
sovereign wealth funds has increased significantly during
the past decade. Various concerns raised by host states—
especially those located in the developed world—regarding
the purposes and objectives of foreign investments made by
these funds have led these states to take measures to protect
themselves. Countries such as Canada, Germany, and the
United States have issued new laws to address these
concerns. Due to the broad discretion and flexibility that
these laws grant to the governments of the host states,
allegations of mistreatment by investors from the Global
South, including sovereign wealth funds, are likely to be
made. Subsequently, investor-state arbitration is likely to
be pursued by injured sovereign investors before various
forums. This article argues that the methodology employed
by the Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S., tribunal is
inadequate for a number of reasons: first, the Nature of
Acts Test employed by the tribunal can lead to undesirable
outcomes; second, states may attempt to disguise their
political objectives through a separate entity that employs
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the same mechanisms and tools as private investors; and
third, the inherent conundrum that is made clear by the
mixture of the sovereign and private characteristics of
sovereign wealth funds compels a broad approach that
takes into consideration the specific characteristics of the
particular sovereign wealth fund involved in a given
dispute. This article further argues that reference to the
general principle of state attribution and laws of sovereign
immunity can help future International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) tribunals
shed further light on the true nature of the particular
sovereign wealth fund involved in a dispute. Finally, it
addresses the order and priority with which these tribunals
should address ICSID’s jurisdictional requirements (as set
forth in the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States) and
the jurisdictional requirements incorporated in the relevant
international investment agreement. On the basis of this
discussion and analysis, this article emphasizes the crucial
need for avoiding generalizations about sovereign wealth
funds and, instead, investigating the specific characteristics
of the particular sovereign wealth funds involved in each
case to arrive at a fair and reasonable decision on the
question of sovereign wealth funds’ standing in arbitration
with ICSID.
I.

Introduction

During the last decade, foreign direct investment
(“FDI”) made by state-owned corporations (“SOCs”),
sovereign wealth funds (“SWFs”), and other sovereign
investment vehicles has increased dramatically. SWFs
have, in particular, witnessed a considerable increase in the
number, size, and value of their Assets Under Management
(“AUM”). Scholars have estimated that the collective
value of SWFs’ AUM around the globe has reached almost
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$7 trillion, and they note that the bulk of this amount is
invested in global financial markets.2 They also note that
SWFs’ number has doubled in the last 15 years.3
The increasing importance of SWFs has been
accompanied by increasing scrutiny from the part of the
states that host SWFs’ investments. The host states have
expressed many concerns directed towards the objectives
and purposes of SWFs’ investment strategies and the lack
of transparency in the management and day-to-day
operation of SWF activities.4 This has led some states,
especially those in the developed part of the world, to issue
new laws on foreign investment or to amend their existing
laws in a manner that guarantees the host state more
flexibility and discretion in determining whether to accept
investment requests made by SWFs.5 This is particularly
due to the fact that studies have shown that the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Canada are preferred
locations for investments by SWFs.6
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Among the characteristics of these new domestic
laws on foreign investment, it can be noted that these laws
employ the use of very broad terms such as “national
security” as grounds for the host state to reject incoming
investments by SWFs.7 One can anticipate that the
application of these new laws will result in disputes
between the host state and SWFs seeking to invest in the
former’s territory.8 Coupled with the fact that some
international investment agreements (IIAs) extend their
substantive protections and standards of treatment to the
pre-investment phase, it becomes easy to understand the
importance of addressing key questions and issues that
might arise with respect to the foreign investments carried
out by SWFs.9
Among the procedural issues and questions that are
likely to arise is the question of whether an SWF qualifies
as an investor in the meaning of the relevant IIA, as well as
whether it has standing to bring an arbitration case against
the host state before the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). SWFs have
already filed several arbitration cases before the ICSID, but
these cases have been settled and the tribunals did not get a
chance to decide on the issue under investigation here.
7
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Only one ICSID tribunal—the Ceskoslovenska Obchodni
Banka, A.S. (CSOB), tribunal—has dealt with the question
discussed in this article regarding the standing of state
entities before the ICSID. However, the methodology
employed by the CSOB tribunal is considered by scholars
to be inadequate. Hence, the relevance and importance of
the search for an alternative approach to the one used by
the CSOB tribunal is evidently clear.
In order to adequately tackle such a complicated
question, Chapter One of this article includes a history of
SWFs to provide context to the issues discussed in
subsequent chapters. Afterwards, we turn to a brief
discussion of relevant issues of international investment
arbitration and ICSID’s jurisdiction. The third chapter
discusses the relevant case law and includes an attempt to
critically analyze the reasoning employed by the CSOB
tribunal before proceeding to a discussion of alternative
approaches and solutions.
CHAPTER ONE: Sovereign Wealth Funds
I.

DEFINING SWFS

As will be discussed, “sovereign wealth fund” is a
recent term. It was coined by Andrew Rozanov in his 2005
paper entitled Who Owns the Wealth of Nations.10
However, no single, universally accepted definition of the
term has been accepted and adopted by scholars. Several
organizations, bodies, and scholars attempted to define the
term; however, although such definitions share certain
characteristics of SWFs (e.g. government ownership of the
funds and the sovereign character of their resources),
10
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discrepancies exist concerning other elements such as the
focus of the investment strategies of the funds regarding
domestic or foreign investment.11 Thus, careful
consideration should be made when defining the term
“sovereign wealth fund,” and adequate attention should be
given to the purpose and context in which SWFs are
discussed and analyzed. The following paragraphs provide
a discussion of the most prominent definitions of SWFs
followed by the definition that best suits the context and
purpose of the present work.
The United States Treasury defines SWFs as
“government interest funds, funded by foreign currency
reserves but managed separately from official currency
reserves. They are pools of money that governments invest
for profit. This money is often used for foreign
investment.”12 In contrast to the narrow definition
suggested by the United States Treasury, the Congressional
Research Service proposes a broader definition of SWFs.
The latter defines SWFs simply as “investment funds
owned and managed by national governments.”13
Furthermore, the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute adopts a
definition that explicitly acknowledges the establishing
state’s ownership of SWFs. It defines SWFs as “a stateowned investment fund composed of financial assets such
as stocks, bonds, real estate, or other financial instruments
funded by foreign exchange assets.”14
Both the International Working Group on SWFs
and the OECD follow the same approach of the Sovereign
11
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Wealth Institute and put forward definitions that highlight
state ownership of the funds. The former defines SWFs as
“[S]pecial-purpose investment funds or arrangements that
are owned by the general government (general government
includes both central and subnational government)”, while
the OECD defines SWFs as “Government-owned
investment vehicles funded by foreign exchange assets.”15
Moreover, some scholars have defined SWFs with
the purpose of establishing such funds in mind. For
instance, Edwin M. Truman, an American economist
specializing in international financial institutions, defines
SWFs as “separate pools of international assets owned and
managed by governments to achieve a variety of economic
and financial objectives.”16 Finally, some scholars propose
a definition of SWFs that sheds light on the investment
strategies of these funds and how these strategies are
determined. For instance, Ashby Monk defines SWFs as
follows:
[G]overnment owned and controlled (directly or
indirectly) investment funds that have no outside
beneficiaries or liabilities (beyond the government or
the citizenry in abstract) and that invest their assets . . .
according to the interests and objectives of the
sovereign sponsor.17
Upon careful review and analysis of the various
definitions of SWFs offered by many scholars and bodies,
certain characteristics can be deduced that are inherent in
the nature and function of SWFs. These characteristics are
that SWFs “ha[ve] to be government controlled, they
“invest in a wide variety of securities,” and they “operate to
15
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effectuate a variety of goals, which largely depend on the
region and status of the nation.”18 However, given the
existence of differences in the political and the economic
context in which different SWFs are established and
function, it happens that these characteristics vary from one
SWF to another.19 In light of the above, it is deemed
important to set the scope of this work by setting forth the
definition according to which reference to SWFs was made
in subsequent parts thereof. In this piece of work, the term
“sovereign wealth funds" was used to refer to specialpurpose investment vehicles, funds, or arrangements that
are owned and controlled, directly or indirectly, by the
sovereign government of their home states, that was
established by a sovereign government out of public funds
in order to pursue macroeconomic purposes, and that
invests mainly in international financial markets.
Accordingly, “sovereign development funds,” which adopt
investment strategies that focus almost exclusively on
investing domestically, are not dealt with here.20
II.

THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF SWFS

Over the past decade, the role that SOCs in general,
and SWFs in particular, play in both their domestic
economies and on the international level has increased
considerably. Some scholars have even described the past
decade as the golden era of SWFs.21 This is evident in the
tremendous growth of both the size and number of SWFs
established in different parts of the world.22 It is also
18
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supported by the significant increase in the value of the
AUM of various SWFs around the globe. In spite of the
lack of accurate data resulting from transparency-related
problems in the management of SWFs and the
discrepancies in the available definitions of SWFs, some
scholars estimate that “SWFs held approximately $7.25
trillion in assets as of September 2015. In September 2010,
it was estimated that these funds held $4.1 trillion,
implying an increase in assets under management of 77
percent in only five years.”23 Concerning the increase in the
number of SWFs, estimates show that these funds, which
are comprised of commodity-based and non-commoditybased funds, doubled in the period starting from the year
2000 until recent days.24
Even though the term “sovereign wealth fund” is
about 12 years old, scholars commenting and writing on
SWFs note that SWFs are not a new creature. Owing to the
difficulties encountered in defining SWFs (a matter that
will be discussed in a subsequent part of this chapter), there
is a disagreement among scholars regarding the date of
birth of such funds. Some trace SWFs back to the 19th
century, while others claim that the first fund was
established in the 1950s.25 However, there is an agreement
between scholars regarding the reasons behind the
significant increase in the relevance and importance of
SWFs. They explain that development is a natural
consequence of “rising global commodity prices, new
resource discoveries, and swelling trade surpluses in many
THE NEW FRONTIER OF SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT, 11-12, 11-25 (Malan
Rietveld & Perrine Tooledano eds., 2017).
23
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24
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large emerging markets, coupled with many years of
exceptional financial market returns.”26
Resource-rich economies have grown to believe in the
importance of SWFs as a tool for combating the uncertainty
of continued rates of income and revenue and the severe
economic, financial, and even societal repercussions
associated with turbulent revenue windfalls.27 Statistical
evidence clearly shows the number of SWFs established in
emerging economies and how the value of their AUM has
increased considerably in many of these economies.
Governments of emerging, resource-rich countries, view
SWFs as a tool through which they can achieve various
economic objectives, which commonly include the
accumulation of long-term savings, investing the country’s
foreign reserve surpluses in global financial markets to
generate revenues, and achieving and maintaining fiscal
stabilization.28
The global financial crisis that took place between 2007
and 2009 and the events that followed it constitute a pivotal
moment in the history of SWFs and demonstrate their
global importance in stabilizing some of the major financial
institutions of developed countries.29 Due to certain
26
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characteristics of SWFs, including their long-term focus
when making their investment decisions and their freedom
from liquidity-related restrictions, these entities were able
to step in and provide much-needed capital to some of the
ailing banking and financial institutions of the developed
world. Being in a desperate situation and in significant need
of capital and liquidity, the developed world and some of
the “too-big-to-fail” financial institutions were eager to
welcome capital injections made by SWFs established by
resource-rich, emerging economies.30
Some of the SWFs located in Middle Eastern
countries have considerably grown in size and the value of
their AUM has achieved new records. For instance, studies
show that the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, one of Abu
Dhabi’s SWFs, now possesses approximately $773 billion,
and the Kuwait Investment Authority has accumulated
approximately $592 billion. Studies also show that some of
the developed countries, such as Canada, the United
Kingdom, and the United States are the subject of focus of
FDI carried out by these SWFs. Before addressing the
concerns of host states, we will discuss the various
definitions of SWFs suggested by different bodies and
scholars in the following section.
III.
CONCERNS RAISED BY HOST STATES
REGARDING SWFS INVESTMENTS AND THE POTENTIAL
OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES
The increasing role of SWFs in global financial
markets and in FDI carried out in the territories of host
states has not been perceived by host states, especially
developed ones, in an entirely positive manner. While no
one disputes the key role played by various SWFs in
supporting the global financial system during the global
30
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financial crisis by injecting huge amounts of capital in
“too-big-to-fail” financial institutions (such as Citicorp and
Merrill Lynch), host states tend to view the capital
injections made by SWFs as some sort of necessary evil.
This is mainly due to the tension between developed and
developing countries concerning foreign investment; such
tension can be traced back to colonialism.
Host states, particularly those in the developed
world, tend to focus on the underlying objectives and
purposes of SWFs’ investments in their territories. In fact,
these countries question the objectives and purposes of
SWFs’ investments and claim that the countries that own
these SWFs seek to disguise their political motives by
creating a separate entity that employs the same tools and
mechanisms used by private investors.31 Expressing these
concerns, President Harry S. Truman once said that the
“reality is that governments own SWFs, governments are
political organizations, and it is naïve to pretend that they
are not.”32 Other concerns expressed by host states include
a lack of transparency in the management, control, and
adoption of mandates and investment strategies within
SWFs. Indeed, a number of scholars commenting on SWFs
have expressed the same concerns and tied them to the lack
of accurate data and information on the day-to-day
functioning of SWFs, their AUM, their mandates, and their
investment strategies and objectives.33
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As a direct result of the aforementioned concerns,
some developed states have actively sought to block certain
investments by SWFs in what the former considered to be
strategically important companies and assets. For instance,
the United States government frustrated Dubai Ports
World’s plans to acquire certain port facilities in a territory
of the United States of America in the year 2006. The
United States viewed this investment as a threat to its
national security and thus prevented it from occurring.34
On the domestic level, some developed countries
actively amended their national laws on foreign investment
in order to allow the executive authorities of such countries
to control and, if necessary, prevent investments by
sovereign investors in their territories.35 Among the
countries that took such measures in recent years are
Canada, Germany and Russia. Among the scholars who
focus on the field of investment arbitration and have seen
the merit of addressing the unique positioning of SWFs and
their increasing importance in the international sphere is
Dr. Waild Ben Hamida. Dr. Ben Hamida has voiced his
concerns and views on the position adopted by a number of
developed countries to block or at least limit investments
made by SWFs based in developing countries; a position
that is reflected in the level of supervision and high-level
internal approvals from already-existing or newly
established governmental bodies. While discussing the new
law that was approved by the German government in 2008,
Dr. Ben Hamida has, for instance, stated that “[this law] is
especially aimed at investments made by sovereign wealth
funds from the Arab States or China and Russian giants
such as the State-owned company Gazprom.”36
34
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These new laws regulating foreign investments by
SWFs and SOEs share certain characteristics, including
allowing the government of a host state to review
investment requests submitted by these entities and to allow
or prevent them based on broad grounds, such as “national
security.”37 While some IIAs confine the protections and
guarantees they offer to foreign investors to the postinvestment phase, others are broader in scope and offer
rights of access and some protections and guarantees even
in the pre-investment phase. Accordingly, should SWFs’
and SOEs’ investment requests be mistreated, SWFs and
SOEs can naturally be expected to explore their options and
available remedies under both domestic and international
law. Since most IIAs now include ICSID as one of the
forums provided for in their dispute settlement provisions,
the probability that the SWF or SOE would prefer ICSID
over the other options is considerably high given the
benefits associated with ICSID arbitration in relation to
annulment, enforcement, and execution of any ICSID
arbitral awards. Hence the relevance of the question that
this article seeks to address: do SWFs qualify as investors
and have standing before ICSID?
Before turning to an analysis of the relevant case
law, the next chapter briefly highlights important
information concerning investment arbitration and the
jurisdictional requirements that must be fulfilled in order
for an ICSID tribunal to hear and decide on investment
disputes.
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CHAPTER TWO: Investor-State Arbitration and
ICSID’s Jurisdiction
I.

The Inception of Investor-state Arbitration

Within the realm of international investment law,
considerable attention is directed by scholars, practitioners,
and transnational businesses towards the substantive
standards of protection and guarantees that IIAs afford to
foreign investors who make investments in the territory of a
host state. However, equal attention is given to the
procedural mechanisms and protections that are provided
for in various IIAs. As a mechanism for the settlement of
investment disputes, investor-state arbitration is now
commonly provided for and incorporated in the disputesettlement provisions of almost all IIAs (whether bilateral
or multilateral).38
Allowing private natural or juridical investors to
directly sue host states, independent of the approval of their
home state, is rightly deemed by scholars to be a pivotal
moment in the history and evolution of the settlement of
foreign investment disputes. Prior to this important
development, a foreign investor had no direct way through
which they could seek recourse against a host state for the
mistreatment of the former’s investment. Foreign investors
had no option available but to make pleas to the
governments of their home states to intervene and begin
38
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negotiations with the government of the host state. This is
what came to be known as “diplomatic protection.”
Naturally, this did not sit well with foreign investors, the
majority of which are multinational corporations. The
inception and development of investor-state arbitration was
hailed by foreign investors, practitioners, and scholars as an
adequate means of filling the gap that existed in the
settlement of investment disputes between private foreign
investors and host states, as well as an efficient means of
depoliticizing foreign investment disputes and removing
the existing tensions between home states and host states.
Accordingly, the drafters of most if not all IIAs instituted
the practice of incorporating a provision in the agreement
to provide for investor-state arbitration.
In addition to the dispute-settlement mechanism
provided for in IIAs for the settlement of investor-state
disputes, these agreements also typically contain another
provision providing mechanisms for the settlement of stateto-state disputes.39 From the inception of this field of law,
the focus of investment arbitration scholars has centered on
investment disputes that arise between foreign, protected
investors and host states. This focus has developed as a
natural consequence of the fact that investment disputes
have been pursued directly between investors and host
states for decades (i.e. without the intervention of home
states). This has led to the side-tracking of state-to-state
disputes despite the fact that investment disputes center
around instruments of international law that are concluded
between states. In a way, protected investors are third-party
beneficiaries of IIAs; however, due to practical
considerations, they have stolen the show from the main
players within the international law sphere: states. State-tostate disputes stemming from IIAs most often concern the
39
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interpretation of one or more provisions within an IIA
and/or the enforcement of the treaty. As many scholars
note, the state-to-state mechanism has rarely been used in
practice, and the bulk of case law on investment disputes
and arbitration was founded and based on the investor-state
mechanism.
II.

THE VARIOUS AVAILABLE FORA FOR INVESTORSTATE ARBITRATION AND THE ADVANTAGES OF ICSID
Investor-state arbitration can be pursued by parties
who have standing before a number of fora. In a particular
case, however, the available options that a foreign investor
can choose from will depend on the relevant dispute
settlement provision(s) of applicable IIA. As in the case of
international commercial arbitration, investment arbitration
can be conducted before an arbitration institution or it can
be conducted on an ad hoc basis. If investor-state
arbitration is to be conducted on an ad hoc basis, dispute
settlement provisions incorporated within IIAs most
commonly refer to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as the
procedural rules applicable to such arbitrations.40
In addition to pursuing investment arbitration on an
ad hoc basis, parties to an IIA can agree to submit any
investment disputes arising between them and investors of
another IIA contracting state to arbitration before a number
of arbitration institutions. Among the world’s existing
arbitration institutions, those most commonly referred to
and agreed upon in IIAs for the settlement of investor-state
40
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procedural rules that shall be applicable to the arbitration proceedings,
it is less common in practice for parties to an arbitration agreement to
follow this approach. The UNICTRAL Arbitration Rules are well
established and respected internationally, and thus the large majority of
ad hoc arbitration is pursued in accordance with these rules.
27

disputes are ICSID, the International Court of Arbitration
of the International Chamber of Commerce, the London
Court of International Arbitration, and the Arbitration
Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. While
all of these arbitration fora or institutions apart from ICSID
were originally designed to settle international commercial
disputes between private parties, ICSID was originally
established to fill a certain gap. The drafters of the
Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States
(ICSID Convention) made it quite clear that ICSID was
created in order to fill in a certain gap and to allow
investor-state investment disputes to be settled in a neutral
and depoliticized manner by means of arbitration or
conciliation. Thus, while international commercial
arbitration institutions such as the International Court of
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, the
London Court of International Arbitration, and the
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce only require the existence of a valid arbitration
agreement between the parties to the proceedings in order
to be satisfied that they have jurisdiction to hear and decide
an investment dispute, the ICSID Convention lays down
additional jurisdictional requirements in Article 25 thereof
that must be fulfilled in order for ICSID to have jurisdiction
and for an ICSID tribunal to have competence.
The various fora before which investor-state
arbitration can be pursued have a reputation as respected
and well-established arbitration institutions. However, due
to a number of factors and benefits related to the postaward phase of ICSID arbitration, there exists a tendency
among private foreign investors to pursue investor-state
arbitration before the ICSID. Given the aforementioned
tendency and preference and the significant increase in the
rates of FDI carried out by public or sovereign investors,
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we are starting to witness SOEs and SWFs taking on the
role of claimant and initiating ICSID arbitration against
host states. In this respect, a crucial question arises as to
whether SWFs meet the jurisdictional requirements of
ICSID and, specifically, whether such entities qualify as “a
national of another contracting state” in accordance with
Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention.
III.

ICSID’S JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

ICSID is an international arbitration institution
dedicated to the settlement of investor-state disputes and
created to fill a certain gap in the settlement of investmentrelated disputes. As a result, the drafters of the ICSID
Convention laid down certain jurisdictional requirements
that must be fulfilled in order for an ICSID tribunal to have
competence to hear and decide disputes brought before it.
Such jurisdictional requirements are provided for in Article
25(1) of the ICSID Convention, which reads as follows:
(1) The jurisdiction of [ICSID] shall extend to
any legal dispute arising directly out of an
investment, between a Contracting State (or any
constituent subdivision or agency of a
Contracting State designated to [ICSID] by that
State) and a national of another Contracting State
. . .41
In accordance with the provision of Article 25(1) of
the ICSID Convention, it is abundantly clear that the
following conditions must be satisfied in order for ICSID to
have jurisdiction over any dispute: (1) the dispute must be
of a legal nature; (2) there must exist a direct relationship
between the dispute and the investment operation/project;
(3) the dispute must be between a contracting state to the
41
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ICSID Convention (host state) and a foreign investor that
has the nationality of a different state (the home state) that
is also a contracting state to the ICSID Convention; and (4)
parties to the arbitration proceedings must have agreed to
submit the dispute to the ICSID.42
Most of the jurisdictional requirements enumerated in
Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention apply in the same
manner to both sovereign FDI and private foreign
investment. Due to the commercial nature of the activities
carried out by sovereign entities and their use of private
mechanisms and methods in carrying out their investments
abroad, sovereign FDI carried out in the territory of a host
state shares the characteristics of private foreign
investments. However, owing to their sovereign characters,
a problem exists regarding whether SOEs and SWFs
qualify as “national[s] of another contracting State” per in
the meaning of Article 25(1). As Fabio Bassan, a professor
of international economic law whose work focuses in part
on sovereign wealth funds, stated:
SWFs are “private sovereign entities,”
performing a private activity and pursuing public
42
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welfare . . . The sovereign character of the fund
on one side, and the commercial nature of the
activity, on the other side, generate the
conundrum, for one cannot treat SWFs as private
players, irrespective of their ownership.43
In light of the aforementioned conundrum, the
question of whether SWFs qualify as investors according to
the ICSID Convention and thus whether such entities have
standing to bring arbitration before the ICSID (provided
that all of the other jurisdictional requirements are fulfilled)
can be problematic. Perhaps it is due to the problematic
nature of this question that, when faced with the issue
concerning state-owned enterprises and corporations, some
ICSID tribunals have chosen to avoid addressing it.
Indeed, ICSID tribunals in various arbitration proceedings
involving sovereign entities as claimants have chosen either
not to deal with the abovementioned question at all or to
confine themselves to the surface and not to delve into the
heart of the matter.44
It was only the ICSID tribunal in CSOB v. Slovak
Republic that took the initiative and discussed the matter at
hand with some level of detail. As such, we now turn to a
discussion of the CSOB arbitration followed by an analysis
of the tribunal’s reasoning.
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CHAPTER THREE: ICSID’s Case Law & Application
I.
I.1

CSOB V. SLOVAK REPUBLIC (ICSID)

THE FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
OF CSOB V. SLOVAK REPUBLIC

The Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. The
Slovak Republic (“CSOB v. Slovak Republic”) arbitration
case was filed by the CSOB (claimant) against the Slovak
Republic (respondent) by virtue of the request for
arbitration that the former submitted to ICSID on April 18,
1997.45 As the tribunal notes in its Decision on Objections
to Jurisdiction dated May 24, 1999, the case revolved
around the claimant’s allegation that the respondent
breached the consolidation agreement that the claimant, the
Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, and the
Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic signed on
December 19, 1993.46
The claimant was established as a commercial bank.
However, this did not prevent the respondent from raising
objections regarding the jurisdiction of ICSID and the
competence of the tribunal based on arguments linking the
claimant to the Czech Republic and stressing that the
dispute was, in reality, between two contracting states to
the ICSID Convention. The claimant based their argument
that ICSID had jurisdiction to hear and decide the dispute
that arose between it and the respondent on Article 8(2) of
the relevant bilateral investment treaty (BIT) (i.e., the
45
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Agreement between the Government of the Slovak
Republic and the Government of the Czech Republic
Regarding the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, which was signed on November 23, 1992, and
entered into force as of January 1, 1993). The respondent
submitted a jurisdictional challenge to the tribunal during
the first session held by the tribunal on October 6, 1997.
By virtue of such a jurisdictional challenge, the respondent
state argued that the ICSID had no jurisdiction to hear and
decide the dispute brought before it by the claimant on the
grounds that that dispute was in fact between two
contracting states to the ICSID Convention (i.e. the Slovak
Republic and the Czech Republic) and not between a
contracting state and a “national of another contracting
state.”47 In support of its jurisdictional objection, the
respondent argued that “a) claimant is a state agency of the
Czech Republic rather than an independent commercial
entity; and b) the real party in interest to this dispute is the
Czech Republic.”48
I.2

THE HOLDING AND REASONING OF THE CSOB
TRIBUNAL

The tribunal rejected the respondent’s jurisdictional
objections relating to the link between the claimant and its
home state and held that the claimant qualifies as an
investor per the meaning of the ICSID Convention and thus
47
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had standing to bring arbitration proceedings before an
ICSID tribunal. In making its decision on the
aforementioned jurisdictional objection, the tribunal first
acknowledged that:
[T]he language of Article 25(1) of the [ICSID]
Convention makes clear that [ICSID] does not
have jurisdiction over disputes between two or
more Contracting States. Instead, the dispute
settlement mechanism set up by the Convention
is designed to deal with disputes between
Contracting States and nationals of other
Contracting States.49
The tribunal then proceeded to note that, while the
term “national” used in Article 25(1) of the ICSID
Convention is clarified in Article 25(2) of the convention to
“include both natural and juridical persons, neither term is
defined as such in the convention.”50 Thus, the tribunal
found it necessary to refer to the legislative history of the
ICSID Convention in the hope that it could provide some
guidance as to the meaning and scope of the term
“national.” Indeed, in its decision on jurisdiction, the
tribunal noted that:
The legislative history of the [ICSID]
Convention indicates that the term “juridical
persons” as employed in Article 25 and, hence,
the concept of “national,” was not intended to be
limited to privately-owned companies, but to
embrace also wholly or partially government-

49
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See id. at ¶ 16.
See id.
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owned companies. This interpretation has found
general acceptance.51
Based on this interpretation of Article 25, which was
based solely on a comment to a preliminary draft of the
ICSID Convention, the tribunal deduced that ownership of
the concerned entity (whether whole or partial) or control
thereof is not the decisive element in answering the
respondent’s jurisdictional objection. In other words,
whether the claimant entity is a public-sector entity or a
private-sector entity does not alone have a bearing on the
jurisdiction of ICSID. Instead, the tribunal found that:
The accepted test for making this determination
has been formulated as follows: . . [F]or purposes
of the [ICSID] Convention a mixed economy
company or government-owned corporation
should not be disqualified as a “national of
another Contracting State” unless it is acting as
an agent for the government or is discharging an
essentially governmental function. Both parties
to this dispute accept this test as determinative.52
The respondent argued that the claimant acted as “an
agent or representative of the state to the international
banking and trading community, that its subsequent
reorganization has not changed its status, and that,
moreover, the instant dispute arises out of the functions
CSOB performed in that capacity.”53 In response, the
tribunal conceded to the respondent’s claim that the
claimant had, for a significant part of its history,
represented its home state in carrying out and facilitating
51
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commercial transactions on foreign soil and also in
transactions that related to the field of international
banking. The tribunal further conceded that the claimant, in
carrying out the aforementioned activities and transactions,
was under the control of its home state, which “required
[the claimant] to do the state’s bidding in that regard.”54
However, the tribunal maintained that the critical
issue in deciding whether the claimant “exercised
governmental functions . . . must be on the nature of these
activities and not their purpose.”55 Upon review of some of
the CSOB’s acts that the tribunal deemed to be relevant in
the context of the case brought before it, and
notwithstanding the fact that the tribunal conceded that the
claimant was acting on behalf of its home state to promote
the latter’s strategies and policies, the tribunal held that
such acts were of an “essentially commercial” nature.56 In
one paragraph of its decision on jurisdiction, the tribunal
explicitly put more weight on the nature of the activities
that are relevant to the dispute and that were carried out by
the CSOB and less so on the purpose of such activities or
on the CSOB’s alleged role as an agent of the state.57
Moreover, another issue of relevance in this work
that the respondent raised to support its jurisdictional
objection was that the agreement around which the dispute
revolved (i.e. the consolidation agreement) was concluded
with the “ultimate goal of . . . the privatization of [the]
CSOB.”58 And since privatization was a state function,
according to the respondent, the claimant was carrying out
governmental functions and, thus, should be deemed by the
54
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tribunal to be a public investor that would not have
standing before an ICSID tribunal.59 In other words, the
respondent argued that the real claimant in this arbitration
was, in fact, the Czech Republic. Additionally, the
respondent asserted that this was actually a dispute between
two contracting states to the ICSID Convention, and
therefore ICSID did not have the jurisdiction to hear and
decide it. However, the tribunal refuted this argument by
re-emphasizing that the relevant criterion according to
which this matter should be decided was that of the nature
of the acts carried out by the claimant entity (i.e. whether
these acts were commercial or governmental in nature).60
Having determined that the activities carried out by
the claimant were essentially commercial and not
governmental in nature, the tribunal rejected the
respondent’s jurisdictional objection and concluded that it
had jurisdiction to hear and decide the dispute.
II.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TRIBUNAL’S
REASONING IN THE CSOB

II.1 ICSID HAS NO JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND
DECIDE DISPUTES BETWEEN TWO CONTRACTING
STATES
ICSID was established by virtue of the ICSID
Convention. The ICSID Convention was concluded on
March 18, 1965 and entered into force on October 14,
1966. It is a matter of consensus among scholars that the
ICSID Convention set up ICSID to fill a gap that existed
prior to its establishment. While there were mechanisms for
the settlement of disputes between two or more states and
for the settlement of disputes between two or more private
59
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parties before the creation of ICSID, there was no
mechanism for the settlement of disputes between host
states of investment and foreign investors.61 Upon ICSID’s
establishment, such a gap was eradicated.
The jurisdiction ratione personae of ICSID is made
clear by virtue of the provision of Article 25 (1) of the
ICSID Convention, which provides that:
(1) The jurisdiction of [ICSID] shall extend to any legal
dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a
Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency
of a Contracting State designated to [ICSID] by that State)
and a national of another Contracting State.62
Moreover, the preamble of the ICSID Convention
explicitly mentions private international investment and
“disputes [that] may arise in connection with such
investment between Contracting States and nationals of
other Contracting States.”63 In addition to the above, the
Report of the Executive Directors of the IBRD on the
ICSID Convention explicitly refers to private international
investment and private international capital. Indeed, the
Report hails the establishment of ICSID as “a major step
toward promoting an atmosphere of mutual confidence and
thus stimulating a larger flow of private international
capital into those countries which wish to attract it.”64 The
Report adds that:
61
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The Executive Directors believe that private
capital will continue to flow to countries offering
a favorable climate for attractive and sound
investments . . . on the other hand, adherence to
the [ICSID] Convention by a country would
provide additional inducement and stimulate a
larger flow of private international investment
into its territories, which is the primary purpose
of the Convention.65
In addition to the clarity and decisiveness of the
drafters of ICSID, as apparent in the provision of
Article 25 of the [ICSID] Convention, it is worth
noting that relevant information regarding the
standing of a State as a party to an ICSID
arbitration can be found in the preparatory work
of the ICSID Convention. Indeed, it has been
remarked that: [d]uring the preparatory work of
the Washington Convention, it seems that there
was an agreement not to consider States as
foreign investors under the [ICSID] Convention.
The representative of France, Mr. Deguen,
indicated that a State and one of its nationals
might well both participate in an investment
operation in another Contracting State. He
pointed out that in that case, it was perhaps
desirable to provide for all three parties to be
associated in the proceedings. Otherwise, there
might be two conflicting decisions in the same
dispute. However, the Chairman, Mr. Broches,
answered that it was preferable for a case of that
type to be dealt with by means of an agreement
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/basic
-en.htm.
65
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between the two States that they would abide by
the decision that would be given in the dispute
between one of them and the investor. He stated
that “It was not desirable to introduce a radical
exception to the provisions of the Convention.”66
Perhaps it is due to this clarity of expression and
consistency between the ICSID Convention, the Report of
the Executive Directors, and the exchanges made during
the preparatory work of the ICSID Convention that ICSID
tribunals agree and stress in their awards that ICSID does
not have competence to decide disputes between two
contracting states. For instance, the tribunal in Maffezini v.
Spain held that “[ICSID] has no jurisdiction to arbitrate
disputes between two states.”67 Reiterating the same
position, the tribunal in CSOB v. Slovak Republic stressed
that “[t]he language of Article 25(1) of the [ICSID]
Convention makes clear that [ICSID] does not have
jurisdiction over disputes between two or more Contracting
States.”68
Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention is utterly
clear: ICSID does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide
disputes between two contracting states. The Report of the
Executive Directors of IBRD on the ICSID Convention, the
exchanges made during the preparatory work for the ICSID
Convention, and various awards rendered by ICSID
tribunals confirm this point. Agreeing to expand on the
definition of investor and/or investment in an IIA
66
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concluded between two contracting states does not and
cannot change the situation.69 The scope of ICSID’s
jurisdiction remains governed primarily by the
requirements and scope of the ICSID Convention itself, and
such scope cannot be deviated therefrom by two or more
contracting states. As such, this article submits that the
CSOB’s reasoning in this regard is correct.
II.2 QUESTIONING THE AUTHORITY OF THE BROCHES
TEST APPLIED BY THE TRIBUNAL
Faced with a challenge to its jurisdiction that was
raised by the respondent state, which argued that the
claimant was “merely an agent of the Czech Republic” and
that, therefore, “there was an identity between the claimant
and the Czech Republic and that the dispute was between
two contracting states,” the tribunal in the CSOB had to
choose the criteria to be used to decide on this challenge.70,
71
Despite the fact that there is a consensus that ICSID has
no jurisdiction to settle disputes between two contracting
states, settling on the criteria to be used by the tribunal to
decide on the respondent’s jurisdictional objection was not
a straightforward or simple issue. This is due to the fact
that, while various provisions of the ICSID Convention are
quite explicit that ICSID has no jurisdiction to settle
disputes between two contracting states, it does not contain
any express provisions that deal with the scenario in which
69
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a tribunal is faced with an arbitration case involving a
public or sovereign body or entity of one state that
contracts with ICSID and another contracting state (i.e. the
host state for the investment). In light of this situation and
the lack of any case law on that particular issue, the tribunal
was faced with no option but to make reference to the
negotiating history of the ICSID Convention and the
Convention’s preparatory work for any guidance on this
matter.72
Upon review of the legislative history of the ICSID
Convention, the tribunal noted that “[i]t indicates that the
term ‘juridical persons’ as employed in Article 25 and,
hence, the concept of ‘national,’ was not intended to be
limited to privately owned companies, but to embrace also
wholly or partially government-owned companies.”73
Immediately afterwards, the tribunal proceeded to make the
following statement: “[t]his interpretation has found
general acceptance.”
Having determined that a wholly or partially
government-owned company falls within the concept of
“national” used in Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, the
tribunal then referenced some statements made in 1972 by
one of the framers of the ICSID Convention, Aron Broches,
during a course that he taught at the Hague Academy of
International Law. The tribunal deemed these statements to
constitute the applicable criteria for deciding whether a
state entity can take part in an ICSID arbitration.74 In this
respect, the tribunal states the following:
It follows that the question whether a company
qualifies as a ‘national of another Contracting
72
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State’ within the meaning of Article 25(1) does
not depend upon whether or not the company is
partially or wholly owned by the government.
Instead, the accepted test for making this
determination has been formulated as follows: ‘.
. . for purposes of the [ICSID] Convention a
mixed economy company or government-owned
corporation should not be disqualified as a
“national of another Contracting State” unless it
is acting as an agent for the government or is
discharging
an
essentially
government
function.75 (emphasis added)
The CSOB tribunal’s progress in this regard is quite
surprising because it lacks any solid or reasonable
justification. First, while it is correct that the preliminary
draft of the ICSID Convention contained a comment
regarding the possibility of a wholly or partially owned
public body or entity as a party to an ICSID arbitration, the
tribunal cannot rely solely on this statement or comment to
justify its conclusion. This is particularly true given the fact
that this comment only appeared in a preliminary draft of
the ICSID Convention, was not reiterated again either in
the ICSID Convention in its final form or in the Report of
the Executive Directors of the IBRD on the ICSID
Convention, and thus cannot carry any weight in supporting
the tribunal’s conclusion.76
Secondly, assuming that the drafters of the ICSID
Convention intended government-owned entities (whether
wholly or partially owned) to be included within the scope
of jurisdiction ratione personae of the ICSID, the tribunal’s
reliance on what came to be called “the Broches Test” is
still hard to justify. Citing statements that one of the
75
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framers of the ICSID Convention, Aron Broches, made
approximately 5 years after the entry into force of the
ICSID Convention during a course that the latter used to
teach at the Hague Academy of International Law as the
applicable criteria to answer the question of a sovereign
entity’s standing in ICSID arbitration can, at best, be
considered as a desperate attempt on the part of the tribunal
to find readily prepared criteria that it can use to determine
its jurisdiction.77 Thus, it is not difficult to imagine a future
ICSID tribunal that, when hearing a dispute involving a
sovereign entity as a party to the proceedings, refuses to
adopt the Broches Test as the applicable test for
determining that sovereign entity’s standing. This is
particularly true because of the lack of a system of
precedents in international investment arbitration.78 In this
respect, it is worth noting how some ICSID tribunals have
dealt with certain tests or criteria laid down and adopted in
previous ICSID awards.
The tribunal in Biwater Gauff, for example, took a
different approach regarding the definition of investment,
and, in fact, criticized the criteria that the tribunal
established in Salini v. Morocco in 2001, which was widely
77
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followed by later ICSID tribunals.79 The Biwater Gauff
Tribunal found that the concept of investment was not
defined in the ICSID Convention and, accordingly, stated
that “ICSID tribunals [have] no authority to impose their
own view[s] of appropriate fixed criteria applicable to all
cases.”80
II.3

INTERPRETING THE ICSID CONVENTION IN
LIGHT OF THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
In contrast with what happened in the CSOB
arbitration, one or both parties to an ICSID proceeding may
refute the Broches Test on one of the grounds mentioned
above. Also, an ICSID tribunal constituted to hear and
decide the dispute in that arbitration, either unilaterally or
on the basis of the parties’ arguments, may conclude that
the Broches Test is not binding and has no authoritative
power. In this scenario, the next logical question that an
ICSID tribunal will have to face is the following: on what
basis should the tribunal make a decision on its jurisdiction
to decide a dispute brought before it by an SWF?
Many scholars writing on the topic of ICSID
jurisdiction over sovereign entities or SOEs have dealt with
this issue. There is a consensus that, in light of the lack of
any explicit provisions on this issue in the ICSID
Convention, interpretation of relevant provisions of the
ICSID Convention should be carried out according to the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.81 This means
that an ICSID tribunal should proceed with the ordinary
79
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meaning of any relevant terms found in the ICSID
Convention in an attempt to determine the true intentions of
the contracting states, with due regard for the context in
which the ICSID Convention was concluded and adopted.82
In light of the context of the ICSID Convention and
its object and purpose (as clarified in previous parts of this
work), it can be argued that the ICSID mechanism is not
meant for investments carried out in the territory of a state
by a sovereign entity that (1) is an arm or agent of its home
state government, and (2) uses sovereign wealth to make its
investment. Allowing standing before an ICSID tribunal to
such a sovereign entity is tantamount to a finding of
jurisdiction for an ICSID tribunal to hear and decide a
dispute between two contracting states to the ICSID
Convention. That is inconsistent with explicit provisions of
the ICSID Convention and previous awards rendered by
ICSID tribunals.
II.4 THE TRIBUNAL’S EMPHASIS ON THE NATURE OF
ACTS TEST DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A BRIGHT-LINE
TEST
Assuming that an ICSID tribunal states that the
Broches Test is the applicable test regarding deciding on its
jurisdiction to hear and decide an investment dispute
involving a sovereign or public entity, we now turn to an
analysis of the application of said test by the CSOB tribunal
and whether such application is adequate. Upon deciding
that the Broches Test is the appropriate choice for the
jurisdiction decision and that both parties to the arbitration
have accepted it as such, the CSOB tribunal turned to an
82
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analysis of the Broches Test in order to determine its
requirement(s). In making its determination as to the
character of the CSOB’s acts (i.e. whether those acts were
governmental or commercial), the tribunal decided that the
sole relevant criterion in this regard was the nature of these
acts. By relying solely on the nature of the CSOB’s acts,
the tribunal explicitly declared that certain issues were
simply irrelevant, including state ownership or control of
the CSOB, the government’s use of the CSOB as a tool to
carry out the latter’s policies, and the underlying motives or
purposes of the CSOB’s investment.
This application of the Broches Test by the CSOB
tribunal is inadequate for a number of reasons. Firstly, as
mentioned above, the CSOB tribunal held that the sole
criteria for determining whether there was unity between
the CSOB and its home state of the Czech Republic was the
nature of the acts performed by the CSOB and whether
these acts were governmental or commercial in nature. The
tribunal presented the Nature of Acts Test and the
distinction between governmental and commercial acts as
simple and straightforward; however, this is not the case.
The undeniable reality is that, even when a certain
government decides to pursue some commercial activities,
it carries them out within a certain political context and
situation. Any variation in that political context has an
impact on how the government proceeds and deals with its
commercial activities. As the OECD articulately puts it:
. . . when governments undertake commercial
activities, they remain answerable to a wide
range of societal pressures that their governance
structures are designed to take into account. For
this reason, governments may encounter
difficulties in making credible commitments to
pursue only ‘commercial’ objectives, since their
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raison d’etre involves being sensitive to political
pressures and to pursuing non-commercial
objectives.83
Along the same lines, Larry Catá Backer stresses that
“there are not separate political and economic playing
fields where States and companies operate respectively . . .
[t]hey both make a political use of financial power trying to
influence the market they operate in.”84
Considering this inherent difficulty in
characterizing a specific act of an entity as purely
commercial or governmental in nature, it is not surprising
that the tribunal in Noble Ventures v. Romania refused to
accept and employ the use of that very distinction when it
made its finding on state attribution. In its decision, the
tribunal noted that “[t]he [International Law Commission
(ILC)] Draft does not maintain such a distinction.” Then
the tribunal proceeded to note that “there is no common
understanding in international law of what constitutes a
governmental or public act.”85
The same rationale used by the Nobel Ventures
tribunal to refute and disregard the distinction between
governmental and commercial acts also applies to SWFs.
On the one hand, according to the various definitions
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offered by scholars and bodies, SWFs are publicly owned
by the government. On the other, SWFs employ private-law
mechanisms in order to carry out their mandates,
investment strategies, and functions. Moreover, it is not
uncommon for ICSID tribunals to reference the law of state
responsibility “as elucidated by the [ILC] in 2001” in order
to decide on the question of whether the actions of an entity
or organ can be attributed to the state (which is a very
similar, if not identical, to the same issue raised in the
CSOB).86 Thus it becomes clear that the Nature of the Acts
Test employed by the CSOB tribunal is not a bright-line
test that leads to predictability and stability. On the
contrary, it is an ambiguous test for which application will
vary from one tribunal to the next.
III.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE
METHODOLOGY EMPLOYED BY THE CSOB

III.1

THE PRINCIPLE OF ATTRIBUTION

The issue of attribution and the various matters
related to it have been addressed in the field of foreign
investment mainly with respect to cases involving an
allegation by the claimant to the effect that the host state of
the investment should be held liable for the acts of one of
its entities. Indeed, most of the available case law in
international investment arbitration that addresses
attribution revolves around that very issue. Scholars were
quick to acknowledge that this does not mean that
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attribution can only be applied by investment tribunals in a
similar situation. As Dolzer and Schreuer note:
In the field of foreign investment, matters of
attribution have most often come up on the side
of the respondent when a state argues that acts by
state entities cannot be attributed to the state.
However, the issue may also be relevant for a
claimant whom a respondent considers as a state
entity rather than a national of another state.87
Clearly, this is exactly what took place in the CSOB.
Whether intentional or not, the CSOB tribunal did not refer
to the principle of attribution at all. Evidently it was
satisfied with the comment to the preliminary draft of the
ICSID Convention and with referring to statements made a
number of years after the adoption of the ICSID
Convention by one of its framers, Aron Broches, and relied
on these statements as the decisive criteria.
Owing to the general character of state attribution and
the existence of extensive case law and jurisprudence on it
in investment arbitration, we are of the opinion that future
ICSID tribunals should take the principle of attribution into
consideration when deciding whether state entities (such as
SWFs or SOEs) have standing before ICSID. In particular,
the principle of state attribution finds its basis in “the
concept of the unity of the state,”88 as well as in a
jurisdictional objection raised by a respondent in an ICSID
arbitration on the basis of the existence of a strong link
between a claimant entity and its home state, which
undoubtedly relates to that concept. Thus, the application of
attribution in the latter case or scenario should not be
considered far-fetched.
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Given that state entities are most often set up by the
state in a manner that conveys upon them a separate legal
personality, the general rule is that the actions of such
entities cannot be attributed to the state. However, there are
exceptions to this general rule. Among these exceptions are
“cases where the corporation exercises public power, and
cases where the state owns the entity provided that ‘control
is exercised in order to ‘achieve a particular result.’’”89
The application of these exceptions to scenarios involving
SWFs and SOEs will entail a broad analysis and
investigation into the structure, function, and control of the
entity in question by the sovereign government. It is likely
that ICSID tribunals’ broad analysis when deciding on the
standing of an SWF or SOE will most likely help alleviate
some of the major concerns that the host state may have
regarding the purpose sought by a particular SWF from a
particular investment, as well as whether such purpose
involves political considerations and objectives of the home
state. In Maffezini v. Spain, the ICSID tribunal took into
consideration a mixture of structure, function, and control.
In its decision on jurisdiction, the tribunal stated the
following:
The question whether or not SODIGA is a State
entity must be examined first from a formal or
structural point of view. Here a finding that the
entity is owned by the State, directly or
indirectly, gives rise to a rebuttable presumption
that it is a State entity. The same result will
obtain [sic] if an entity is controlled by the State,
directly or indirectly. A similar presumption
arises if an entity’s purpose or objectives is the
carrying out of functions which are governmental
in nature or which are otherwise normally
89
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reserved to the State, or which by their nature are
not usually carried out by private businesses or
individuals.90
Also, in Salini v. Morocco, the tribunal relied on both
the structural aspect of ADM—including its legal
personality, management, and ownership—and its
functional aspect. The tribunal found that “ADM being . . .
a body distinguishable from the State only by virtue of its
legal status, the Tribunal . . . concludes that the Italian
companies have shown that ADM is a State company,
acting in the name of the Kingdom of Morocco.”91
Toto v. Lebanon is particularly important when the
issue of standing before ICSID is raised concerning an
SWF. This is due to the fact that the Toto tribunal had to
decide whether the actions of two entities that carried out
public works (CEPG and its successor, CDR), received
funding from the sovereign government, were controlled
indirectly by the state, or were attributable to the state.92
Having found that both entities “exercised governmental
authority in the sense of Article 5 of the ILC Articles,” the
tribunal decided that the actions of these entities were
attributable to the state and that it therefore had jurisdiction
to decide the dispute. Since SWFs are owned by the
sovereign government, receive funding from sources that
can be categorized as sovereign wealth, and carry out the
function of investing this sovereign or public money to
achieve certain objectives entrusted to them by the
government, the decision of the Toto Tribunal is of
90
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particular relevance to the standing of SWFs as claimants
in ICSID arbitration. Despite the potential benefits of
applying the principle of attribution to answer the question
of SWFs standing before ICSID tribunals, it is worth noting
that the outcome of such an application will necessarily
differ from one case to another depending on the specific
circumstances of each case. Such circumstances may
include how each SWF is established and managed, what
its mandates and investment strategies are, and the degree
of actual independence that it has from the sovereign
government.93
III.2

THE LAWS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Acknowledging the inadequacy of the CSOB
tribunal’s methodology regarding the Nature of Acts Test
and the question of SWF and SOE standing before ICSID
tribunals, some scholars have hinted at the possibility of
turning to sovereign immunity laws for guidance.94 Since
SWFs were originally intended to invest sovereign wealth
primarily in foreign assets, SWFs were intended to (and
commonly do) “enter into a legal relationship with private
natural or legal persons governed by the national law of the
host State (including its conflict of law rules). The question
then arises whether they could be sued before the courts of
the latter.”95 While the laws of sovereign immunity are
93
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meant to apply when a case involving a foreign state is
brought before the national court of another state, such laws
can also be referenced with respect to a particular SWF in
order to determine whether the link between that fund and
its home state reached a certain level after which the
sovereign status of the home state would extend to that
fund.96 If that was found to be the case, one could argue
that such a fund lacked standing to bring a dispute
concerning its foreign investment before ICSID. This is
simply because the dispute in such a case would qualify as
a dispute between two contracting states to the ICSID
Convention, and thus ICSID has no jurisdiction to hear and
decide it.
Factors that ICSID tribunals should take into
consideration to guide their investigations into the link
between the SWF in question and its home state and
whether the sovereign character of the state extends to that
fund could include the legal personality of the fund (or lack
thereof), the source of the fund’s capital, the fund’s
mandates, the fund’s management and the public goals set
by the government for the fund. Given that the existing
SWFs are heterogeneous, the finding of the tribunal will
necessarily vary from one case to the next depending on the
specific details of the SWF in question and its relationship
with its home state. While reference to the laws of
sovereign immunity in relation to the question of SWFs’
standing before ICSID does not provide us with a brightline test that provides predictability and stability, it does
enable ICSID tribunals to broadly investigate the overall
96
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framework within which a particular SWF exists and
carries out its functions. This will certainly help alleviate
some of the major concerns that a host state may have
regarding a particular SWF’s purposes and objectives.
Given the importance and significance of SWFs in
the field of foreign investment has increased dramatically
during the last decade, and considering the ambiguity
surrounding the issue of whether SWFs fall within the
definition of an investor as one of the conditions of
benefiting from both the substantive and procedural
protections of IIAs, some states sought to include SWFs in
the definition of an investor’ by making an explicit
reference to SWFs in the IIAs they form with other states.
While this is not a problem in cases where arbitration is
sought before fora dedicated to commercial arbitration, the
situation is different when parties seek investor-state
arbitration before ICSID. This is simply due to the fact that
the ICSID Convention has its own jurisdictional
requirements. Therefore, an important question arises
regarding whether an explicit provision in an IIA that
includes SWFs as investors would have an impact on
ICSID’s jurisdiction. This matter is discussed in the
following section.
IV.

RECENT BIT PRACTICE INCLUDING SWFS IN
THE NOTION OF THE INVESTOR AND ITS IMPACT ON
ICSID’S JURISDICTION

IV.1 DEFINITION OF AN INVESTOR IN THE ICSID
CONVENTION
As previously mentioned, the jurisdictional
requirements of ICSID are set forth in Article 25 of Chapter
II: Jurisdiction of the Centre of the ICSID Convention. In
its first and second paragraphs, Article 25 stipulates that:
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(1) The jurisdiction of [ICSID] shall extend to
any legal dispute arising directly out of an
investment, between a Contracting State (or any
constituent subdivision or agency of a
Contracting State designated to [ICSID] by that
State) and a national of another Contracting
State, which the parties to the dispute consent in
writing to submit to [ICSID]. When the parties
have given their consent, no party may withdraw
its consent unilaterally.
(2) ‘National of another Contracting State’’
means:
(a) . . .
(b) any juridical person which had the nationality
of a Contracting State other than the State party
to the dispute on the date on which the parties
consented to submit such dispute to conciliation
or arbitration and any juridical person which had
the nationality of the Contracting State party to
the dispute on that date and which, because of
foreign control, the parties have agreed should be
treated as a national of another Contracting State
for the purposes of this Convention.97
As it clearly appears from the above provisions, the
drafters of the ICSID Convention failed to provide—or
perhaps deliberately omitted—a specific mechanism or
method to be used by ICSID tribunals to determine whether
a claimant investor, as a juridical person, satisfies the
jurisdictional condition of nationality pursuant to the ICSID
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Convention.98 This is a point with which most if not all
ICSID tribunals and scholars that write on nationality
within ICSID’s jurisdiction begin their discussion.99 For
instance, in light of the provision of Article 25 of the ICSID
Convention, it has been remarked by scholars that “the
threshold jurisdictional question of nationality – like the
threshold question of ‘investment’ – looms large as the
basis for potential objections to jurisdiction on the part of
respondent States.”100 Given the fact that the drafters of the
ICSID Convention did not explicitly provide such a
method, tribunals constituted under the auspices of the
ICSID have differed in their application of the nationality
requirement, with “[t]he overwhelming weight of the
authority . . . point[ing] towards the traditional criteria of
incorporation or seat for the determination of corporate
nationality under Art. 25(2)(b).”101
IV.2 VARIATIONS IN THE DEFINITION OF
NATIONALITY IN BITS
After a careful overview of the relevant provisions of
various model BITs concerning the requirement(s) that a
juridical person must satisfy in order to qualify as a
protected investor of one contracting party—and thus be
protected by the substantive and procedural provisions of
an international investment agreement—one can safely
state that three criteria may be employed by investment
tribunals: the state of incorporation, control, or seat of the
juridical person.102 Regarding the nationality requirement
provided for in Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, an
98
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undeniably relevant issue is that “[t]ypically, modern IIAs
afford a right to non-State actors (such as an individual or
an enterprise) to invoke the compulsory dispute settlement
provisions of the treaty by initiating arbitral proceedings
against a host State.”103 In light of this, states that are home
to SWFs—particularly those that are home to the largest
SWFs—try to negotiate the provisions of the BITs that they
form to incorporate express terms in the provision defining
an investor, with the desired effect that the SWFs would
qualify as investors. This stems from the desire to ensure
that SWFs’ investments in the territory of the host state are
protected by the substantive and procedural provisions of
the BITs and, accordingly, that the SWFs are able to initiate
investment arbitration against the host state in case a legal
dispute arises out of an SWF’s investment in the territory of
that state.
However, whether the home state of the SWF is
successful depends on the respective negotiating power of
both the home state and the host state. Of course, the
probability of the success of the SWF’s home state in this
regard becomes higher as the host state’s need for capital
becomes more urgent. As Whitsitt and Weiler stated:
. . . the various definitions of investor found in
IIAs could be understood on a spectrum with one
end demarcated by a definition that expressly
includes SWFs and may even go so far as to
name specific SWFs. In that case, the ordinary
meaning should be self-evident. At the other end
of the spectrum is a definition that expressly
excludes SWFs or States parties and their
corporations or agents. Again, the ordinary
meaning should be self-evident. Most
103
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definitions of investor, however, are not clear
and fall in the middle of these two extremes.104
For instance, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi
Arabia, among other countries, own some of the largest
SWFs in the world; as a result, these states often ensure that
the definition of an investor in any IIA they consider
forming contains a broad definition that enables the
extension of the protections provided by that IIA to their
SWFs. As such, we notice that the broad definition of an
investor is included in the majority—if not all—of the BITs
that Saudi Arabia formed between 2001 and 2011. The
provision defining the term “investor” in Saudi Arabia’s
BITs with other states stipulates that:
3. The term ‘investor’ means:
(a) . . .
(b) in respect of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:
(i) . . .
(ii) . . .
(iii) the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
and its financial institutions and authorities such as the
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, public funds and
other similar governmental institutions existing in
Saudi Arabia.105
In the preceding paragraphs, we saw how some home
states of SWFs succeeded in incorporating a definition of
104
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an investor in their BITs with other states. Their purpose
was to explicitly or implicitly guarantee that SWFs would
benefit from the protections and guarantees of the BITs and
would have standing in investment arbitration. If the
provision of the relevant IIA explicitly or implicitly
included SWFs in its definition of an investor, and if a
SWF decided to bring arbitration against the host state
before any arbitration forum provided for in that BIT’s
dispute-settlement provision other than ICSID, the issue of
jurisdiction ratione personae would be straightforward.
However, should the SWF decide to bring its arbitration
case before ICSID, the following question would arise:
should the agreement of the parties to the BIT prevail over
the jurisdictional requirements of ICSID, or should the
ICSID tribunal defer to the agreement of the parties to the
BIT only within the limits set forth in the ICSID
Convention?
IV.3 PRIORITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO ICSID’S
JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
There are not any ICSID arbitral awards that
explicitly discuss the order of the analysis or investigation
that an ICSID tribunal should follow when faced with a
question regarding whether the claimant qualifies as an
investor under both the ICSID Convention and the
provisions of the relevant IIA. However, there are ICSID
arbitral awards that discuss the very issue of the order to be
followed by an ICSID tribunal when faced with a question
regarding the qualification of the claimant’s transactions or
activities in the territory of the host state as an investment.
Therefore, it is important that reference be made in this
respect to decisions that tackled the issue of the priority or
order between the ICSID Convention and the relevant IIA
in the context of the definition of an investment by way of
analogy. This is especially important because the drafters
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of the ICSID Convention failed to provide a definition of
both an investor and an investment. The issue in question is
whether an ICSID tribunal should address its competence
first based on the requirements of the ICSID Convention
and then, if satisfied, address the requirements under the
relevant IIA. This is a general question that deals with the
fulfilment or lack thereof of a jurisdictional requirement for
an ICSID tribunal.
Given the lack of a definition of the term
“investment” in Article 25 of the ICSID Convention,
arbitral tribunals constituted under the auspices of ICSID
have varied in the approach that they adopted to answer the
considerably important question of whether a claimant’s
activities or transactions in the territory of the respondent
state qualify as an investment. On the one hand, some
ICSID tribunals have given deference to the agreement of
the parties in their BIT, as encapsulated in the provision
that defined the term “investor.”106 For instance, the
majority of the members of the tribunal in the Tokios
arbitration, in agreement with the tribunal in the Wena
Hotels Ltd v. Arab Republic of Egypt, took the view that
“the international law direction was to favour the expansion
of arbitral jurisdiction.”107,108 In order to settle the issue of
the tribunal’s jurisdiction and competence, they then relied
on the relevant provisions of the BIT between Ukraine and
Lithuania, which defined the term “investor.”109 The
majority’s decision in Tokios did not sit well with the other
member of the tribunal, Professor Weil, who drafted a
dissenting opinion.
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In his opinion, Professor Weil made an argument for
the inclusion of the origin of capital among the criteria used
to determine whether the claimant qualified as an
investor.110 To support his argument, Professor Weil
claimed that such an inclusion would be consistent with the
object and purpose of the ICSID Convention.111 More
importantly in the present context, Professor Weil argued
that:
. . . the Tokios decision reversed the proper order
of analysis: the majority should first have
considered whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction
under Article 25 of the [ICSID] Convention, and
only after that assessed jurisdiction under the
BIT, in keeping with the ICSID principle that
parties to a BIT can narrow but not expand the
jurisdiction provided by the Convention.112
It is worth noting that, despite the logical and
persuasive character of the arguments put forward by
Professor Weil, the tribunal simply chose to neglect these
arguments and did not offer any response.113
On the other hand, some ICSID tribunals took the
opposite view and, in the course of addressing and settling
the issue of their jurisdiction and competence, gave
deference to the provisions of the relevant IIA only to the
extent that the definitions in the IIA did not exceed the
limits set forth in the ICSID Convention, with respect to
ICSID’s jurisdiction. For example, in its decision on
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jurisdiction, the tribunal in Aguas del Tunari v. Republic of
Bolivia “proceeded to address the applicable substantive
law, and in this viewed the BIT as determinative, with
jurisdiction under the BIT being limited by the
jurisdictional provisions of the ICSID Convention.”114
Confirming the point expressed in the Aguas del Tunari v.
Bolivia arbitration, the tribunal in Joy Mining v. Egypt,
while dealing with the issue of the definition of an
investment in order to decide on its competence and
jurisdiction, held that “there is a limit to the freedom with
which the parties may define an investment if they wish to
engage the jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals.”115
In light of the above, it is clear that the various
ICSID awards reflect conflicting positions with respect to
the order of analysis and investigation between the ICSID
Convention and the BIT provisions. Thus, the matter is not
settled in ICSID case law, and—in light of the lack of a
system of precedents in international investment
arbitration—we will have to wait and observe how future
arbitral tribunals constituted under the auspices of ICSID
deal with this issue. However, this article asserts that the
argument submitted for the prevalence of the jurisdictional
requirements set forth in the ICSID Convention, as some
prominent scholars have noted, “appears persuasive on its
face.”116
II.

Conclusion

In light of the above, it is clear that the role of
SWFs in foreign investment has considerably increased
throughout the past decade, and that host states have not
114
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taken this matter lightly. Owing to persisting tensions
among developed and developing countries in the field of
international investment law, states that host FDI that is
carried out by SWFs in particular and SOEs in general have
considered such investments with scrutiny. Host states have
amended their domestic laws that deal with foreign
investment and have legislated new laws to provide their
governments with more flexibility and broad discretion to
control—and even prevent—investments that SWFs seek to
make in their territory. This is achieved mainly by
reference to broad terms, such as national security, that
give host states the right to reject access to foreign
investors in general and SWFs and SOEs in particular.
Given that some IIAs have extended the scope of
their substantive and procedural protections to the preinvestment phase, and that host states could discriminate
against SWFs and SOEs by rejecting or cancelling their
investments on grounds related, inter alia, to national
security reasons, it is likely that we will gradually witness
more ICSID cases brought by SWFs and SOEs against host
states. Accordingly, determining whether an SWF has
standing to bring an arbitration case before ICSID as a
“national of another Contracting State’” is a considerably
important issue that demands more attention from scholars.
This article also examined the reasoning of the
ICSID tribunal in the CSOB arbitration and emphasized
that the methodology used by that tribunal failed to provide
a clear, adequate, or comprehensive approach that would
help settle the issue of ICSID standing for SWFs. This
article questioned the CSOB tribunal’s reliance on the
Broches Test because of the lack of any authoritative power
that could be attributed to statements made by one of the
drafters of the ICSID Convention years after its enactment.
Moreover, this article has demonstrated that the Nature of
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Acts Test employed by the CSOB tribunal is not consistent
with the inherent conundrum in the nature of SWFs (i.e. the
inherent mixture of sovereign and private characteristics).
Finally, in an attempt to provide alternative
approaches to the methodology used by the CSOB tribunal,
this article discussed the possibility of referring to the
principle of attribution and the laws on sovereign immunity
for guidance regarding how to approach the issue of ICSID
standing with respect to SWFs. While it is true that
referring back to these doctrines will not provide future
ICSID tribunals with bright-line tests that would lead to
consistent findings of jurisdiction or lack thereof in cases
involving different SWFs, this does not detract from the
fact that these doctrines will provide future ICSID tribunals
with broad and comprehensive tests that take into
consideration various relevant factors, such as the structure
of an SWF, its management, the sources of its funds, the
ownership and level of control that the sovereign
government enjoys over the activities of the particular fund,
and the purposes and objectives that the particular fund
seeks to realize through its investment in the territory of the
host state.
As Walid Ben Hamida stated, “[s]overeign battles
under investment treaties may take place soon.”117 Thus,
there is an imminent need for scholars to address the
important questions that may arise when these battles
begin. The issue of ICSID standing for SWFs is one of
these questions.
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